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Conventional understandings label Chinese Neo-Confucians as moralists and 
localists, who advocate moral cultivation to the neglect of statecraft knowledge 
acquisition, and choose to devote themselves to the autonomy of their local 
communities over national interests. My research attempts to revise this 
understanding by reexamining Neo-Confucian activism from 1200 to 1800 CE. 
Reacting to sociopolitical issues of the time, leading Neo-Confucian activists 
redesigned a secular social order according to their understandings of Confucian 
ideals canonized in the Classics. I argue that Neo-Confucian activism involved 
both moral self-cultivation and statecraft knowledge acquisition so that its 
practitioners were able to effectively assume their sociopolitical duties according 
to their understandings of the Classical texts. Among Neo-Confucian activists, 
the tension that was maintained between self-cultivation and sociopolitical 
concerns as well as that between localism and centralized government, brought 
them mental crises and intellectual controversies. Their intellectualist knowledge 
horizon, though, remained a combination of moral self-cultivation and 
Confucian statecraft tradition in their relations to the imperial power. While the 
imperial power elevated Neo-Confucian morality as imperial ideology to justify 
its political legitimacy, the Neo-Confuican society tended to claim its authority 
over morality. Both parties, however, shared the pursuit of statecraft knowledge 
and skills in order to maintain a sociopolitical order at the local and national 
levels, which was institutionalized in the knowledge horizon required for the 
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civil service examinations to ensure 
the state-society collaboration. Self-
cultivation in Neo-Confucian political 
discourses was advocated not for 
moral advancement per se but instead 
for statecraft. The tension between 
moralism and intellectualism came to 
end in the seventeenth century with 
the failure of moralism in dealing with 
sociopolitical crises and the return to 
intellectualism based on book learning 
and statecraft tradition. Ultimately, it 
was not moralism, but intellectualism 
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My research begins with Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi’s (1130–1200) 
program of learning that dominated the Chinese literati’s intellectual life from 
the fourteenth through the early twentieth centuries. Zhu Xi’s program provided 
not only an ideological justification for the imperial states but an intellectual 
justification of the elite attitude towards learning and their sociocultural vision. 
In his program, Zhu Xi advocated knowledge acquisition as the prerequisite for 
moral self-cultivation through the studies of the Confucian Classics and the 
investigation of things (gewu, meaning understanding what makes a thing what 
it is). To achieve sagehood meant to put what one had learned from the Classics 
into intellectual and sociopolitical practice. He developed a comprehensive 
scope of knowledge and a tradition of intellectualism for Neo-Confucian moral 
cultivation and knowledge acquisition.
Zhu Xi’s program of learning was institutionalized with the reinstatement and 
reinforcement of the civil service examination system in the fourteenth and 
early-fifteenth centuries. His commentaries on the Classics were designated as 
the subject matter of the examinations, and the early-fifteenth-century imperial 
patronage (with adaptation) elevated it to imperial ideology. In spite of partly 
betraying Zhu Xi’s original vision, the imperial power deliberately preserved 
the knowledge horizon that he planned, for the court still expected its employed 
scholars to be both morally virtuous and practically capable of administrating its 
government units and subjects. The degenerating examination culture did not 
challenge Zhu Xi’s knowledge horizon, and in the fifteenth century his program 
was still used to deal with the sociopolitical crises the Ming court faced. In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the flourishing Yangming school of Neo-
Confucianism philosophically challenged Zhu Xi.  It initiated a moral cultivation 
movement in Chinese society by advocating the cultivation of the moral intuition 
in one’s mind and downplaying knowledge acquisition through the studies of 
the Classics. The Yangming moral movement turned out to be a failure, and its 
leading practitioners’ knowledge practice continued to follow the pattern that 
Zhu Xi had planned. Zhu Xi’s intellectualism based on book learning was finally 
restored in Confucian intellectual life in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
My research historicizes these changes in knowledge culture in the political, 
social and intellectual context of late imperial China, focusing on the roles 
that the imperial state and literati society played in forging the Neo-Confucian 
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